









The Effects of Trade Reform on Labour Mobility Across
South African Local Labour Markets
Abstract
The extent to which labour market are affected by trade liberalization depends
crucially on their ease of reallocating labour and factors of production across re-
gions and sectors of the economy. However, previous literature has provided little
insight on the role of migration and labour market frictions in shaping the effects
of trade reform across regions in South Africa (SA). This paper considers this key
question by observing the effect of tariff reform on the spatial reallocation of labour
across sectors and regions over the period, 1996 to 2011. Overall, tariff reductions
on imports in SA has induced spatial reallocation of labour in SA with a dominant
flow of labour from regions/sectors with characteristically high tariff reductions
towards regions/sectors of low tariff reductions. Critically, the paper finds that pull
factors assimilated through the import competition channel have a positive signi-
ficant effect on the migration rate, while the opposing push effect is insignificant.
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1 Introduction
The importance of this study lies in the observation that the onset of tariff liberalization
in SA from 1994 saw a substantial increase in imports that have reflected in a substantial
restructuring of the economy (Edwards 2001, Rodrik 2008). Existing international liter-
ature (Topalov 2010, Porto 2003, Goldberg & Pavcnik 2004) has focused on the welfare
effects of trade liberalization in terms of income and poverty, finding nuanced results.
However, little research has addressed the mechanisms at the local level through which
trade liberalization effects employment, which is critical for developing economies with
an abundance of unskilled labour and high unemployment. In addition, there is a gap
in the literature that considers trade liberalization and internal migration flows within
the same framework. While Borjas et al. (1997) consider how immigration and trade
openness affect labour market outcomes through skill based rigidities, little research has
considered the effect of increased trade openness on internal migration flows. Hence,
this paper seeks to contribute to existing trade literature by determining how increased
trade openness can be mapped to internal labour market adjustments. Importantly, this
study aims to uncover how the degree of mobility determines the impact of trade reform
on social welfare, which may vary according to skill, gender and age.
The hypothesis underpinning this study is that there exists imperfect mobility or
frictions to the movement of labour across sectors and across regions, which may com-
pound the effect of regional disparities in trade reform on labour market outcomes. The
central premise is that under imperfect mobility, a negative trade shock may provide
distributional effects in the presence of imperfect factor reallocation. This is because
expanding industries, such as services, may be unable to perfectly absorb labour losses
in other industries, such as manufacturing that have experienced large exposure to im-
port competition. Standard economic theory, the Heckscher-Ohlin model, provides the
prediction that in the presence of perfect factor mobility, the gains of trade flow to the
abundant factors, namely unskilled labour in developing countries. Specifically, this
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paper breaks down the hypothesis of perfect mobility within the country and between
industries. This paper rather supports the research on specific factors, which shows that
when factors are immobile or specific, the gains/losses are concentrated on those factors
to industry.
Furthermore, recent trade models (Flaig et al. 2013 and Patron 1999) have negated
this theoretical prediction of perfect factor mobility. The studies suggest that trade lib-
eralization may reduce the welfare of unskilled labour in a labour abundant country and
furthermore, the distributional welfare consequences may vary across skill level and
gender. In particular, Flaig et al. (2013) use a computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model with imperfect reallocation of labour and the inclusion of a migration function to
describe the movement of labour between sectors. The assumption of perfectly mobility
of labour across regions means that the consequences of trade shocks for workers may
be nullified. Hence, in this study, we relax this assumption by considering the slug-
gish or incomplete adjustment of labour demand movements in response to the trade
shock, as suggested by previous literature, Autor et al. (2013) and Dix-Carneiro (2014).
Hence, this study exploits the variation in tariff reduction across regions, sectors and
time to determine the nature and size of the labour reallocations, stemming from the
initial regional variations in industrial structure before the onset of the reforms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical evid-
ence of trade liberalization induced spacial reallocation of labour and the migration fric-
tions that arise in the presence of free trade and furthermore, contrasts our approach to
the related literature. Section 3 describes how the variable measures for tariff reform and
internal migration are derived, the regression models used and the related assumptions
made. Furthermore, analysis of the data guides our interpretation of the responsiveness
of labour in various sectors and regions to these shocks and the observed changes in the
pattern of industry specialization, labour market outcomes and geographical dispersion.
Section 4 provides our primary OLS and 2SLS estimates of the impact of tariff reform
2
on labour mobility and specifically, the movement of workers from regions/sectors of
high import competition towards less internationally competitive regions/sectors. Sec-
tion 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Baldàrrago and Salinas (2017) study the effect of tariff reform on socioeconomic factors
in Peru. The paper suggests that there is a significant increase in migration in response to
tariff reductions. Furthermore, the study uncovered a significant negative link between
tariff reduction and socioeconomic indicators of import-competing regions. Consistent
with this theory, Mendez (2015) analyzes the variation in import competition across
regions in Mexico, originating from initial differences in industry specialization. In
particular, the paper observed the effect of Chinese import exposure on the Mexican
local labour market and found that there was a significant degree of labour mobility
induced by the negative trade shock. In particular, a one standard deviation rise in
import exposure is associated with a two percentage point decrease in the working age
population of a municipality.
Furthermore, Zi (2017) analyses the effect of trade liberalization on the reallocation
of labour in China. The study found that more than 30 percent of inter-regional em-
ployment changes can be attributed to trade reform and that this is mainly driven by
labour adjustment/transfers between regions. Importantly, the paper pointed to trade-
induced reallocation of labour across regions and sectors and migration frictions as the
core determinants of the magnitude of trade impact on local regional units. Within this
context, migration frictions pertain to the human capital and physical resources required
to relocate across regions. It can be said that disparities in skill level, age and gender
may determine the ability of individuals to overcome barriers to labour reallocation,
and these are known as migration frictions. Nevertheless, Ma and Tang (2016) con-
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duct a multi-city multi-industry framework with imperfect labour mobility. The authors
suggest that increased trade openness induces bilateral migration flows from inland to
coastal regions, which magnifies gains from trade and creates more spatial income in-
equality, concentrating the upper distribution of income towards richer coastal regions.
Fan (2015) reveals that increased trade openness increases the skill premium within a
region and raises the between region inequality for labour with similar skills. In more
detail, across workers with similar skills, some urban unskilled workers experience wel-
fare gains, while others experience welfare losses. The geographical location of a region
is also imperative as regions on the coast achieve most of the welfare gains, while in-
terior regions benefit little.
More generally, Artuç and McLaren (2010) construct a model of the Turkish labour
market, wherein each worker is able to switch between sectors each period at a cost.
This cost differs for each worker over time according to a distribution of parameters,
estimated by a Euler equation. The paper found that the manufacturing and construction
sector composed of 32.8 percent of the aggregate labour force in the tariff steady state,
but under free trade, composed only 28.5 percent of the total labour force. Furthermore,
the evidence revealed that high intersectoral moving costs lead to significant welfare
losses for workers in the liberalizing sector that may only be partially alleviated over
time. In contrast, workers in other sectors experienced a significant welfare benefit, as
was the case for the aggregate economy. In addition, it is evident that all other sectors
gain labour, driven by free trade, but this labour force adjustment is sluggish, taking
roughly a decade to be realized.
Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2007) use linked employer-employee data on Brazil’s
broad labour force from 1986 to 2001 and the metropolitan household survey, which
provides information on formal sector employment and annual work status changes, to
determine whether labour force reallocations occur in response to trade reform. The
authors suggest that trade liberalization is associated with more frequent failures of
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labour reallocations in the formal sector, more frequent shifts to informal occupations
and ultimately higher unemployment. Furthermore, free trade is consistent with more
frequent labour force withdrawals, and longer durations of labour reallocations after
trade reform. Hence, although product-market reallocations can occur rapidly after trade
reform, developing countries, such as Brazil, may expect incomplete and prolonged
labour market adjustment.
Topalov (2010) supports the theories of trade liberalization that do not assume per-
fect mobility of factors across sectors. In particular, the paper uses the 1991 post trade
reform period in India to measure the impact of trade liberalization on poverty and
found that inflexible labour laws in various Indian states had the effect of impeding la-
bour adjustment across sectors. Consequently, these areas were more adversely affected
by trade reform. In contrast, states with flexible labour laws, experienced movements of
labour and capital across sectors and overall faster growth of manufacturing that eased
the shock of the relative price change. In terms of the least mobile individuals, the paper
found that the trade-consumption link is concentrated among individuals at the bottom
end of the consumption distribution, which are the least geographically mobile. The
premise underpinning this trade-consumption link may be that low income individuals
consume relatively more traded goods, while high income individuals consume relat-
ively more services, which comprise the least traded sectors. Hence, transitioning from
autarky to trade, it could be that the relative prices of the goods consumed by the poor
with higher intensities decreases to a larger extent relative to the rich.
Acemoglu et al. (2014) observe the effects of trade reform at the firm level by use
of US input-output data in order to create downstream trade shocks for manufacturing
and non-manufacturing activities. The paper suggests that an adverse shocks to one
industry can be transferred to other industries through linkages between sectors. This
lies in the tendency of buyers and suppliers to locate in close proximity. The impact of
increased import competition in downstream industries is then likely to be transferred to
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suppliers in the same regional market. Hence, inter-industry linkages magnify the size
of the impact within manufacturing and produce a similarly large employment effect
beyond manufacturing. Another linkage occurs between sectors through changes in
aggregate demand and the labour adjustment. When manufacturing contracts, workers
who have lost their jobs or suffered reduced earnings consequently curb demand for
goods and services. Workers who exit manufacturing transition to jobs in the service
sector or elsewhere, replacing some of the earnings lost in import competing industries,
and hence offset these adverse aggregate demand effects. Thus, aggregate demand and
reallocation effects work in opposing directions.
Casacuberta and Gandelman (2010) characterize the factor reallocation and adjust-
ment process in the manufacturing sector in Uruguay to determine how trade reform
affects reallocation of production factors and firm productivity. The paper found that
creation and destruction rates for employment and capital were relatively high and per-
sistent over time, both for white and blue-collar employment. Capital intensity rose in
response to trade liberalization, while the capital labour price ratio fell. This is con-
sistent with a shift towards more capital intensive technologies. Most of the excess
reallocation, or reallocation not required to accommodate factor use changes, was due
to flows within rather than between sectors. Hence the speed of reallocation appeared to
be linked to firm level heterogeneity rather than to aggregate shocks. Specifically, lar-
ger, more mature firms have a tendency to create and destroy fewer jobs and less capital
relative to smaller, younger firms.
In terms of the effects of trade reform by gender, UNCTAD (2004) suggest that the
negative effects of increased trade exposure is experienced disproportionately by women
relative to men, which can be attributed to generally lower skill and weaker bargaining
power of women. This adverse shock is said to be magnified by existing gender inequal-
ity. Hayashi et al. (2004) confirm this theory and indicate that the textiles and clothing
sector is an important source of employment for women in developing countries, which
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is characteristically their largest employer after agriculture. However, they are largely
underrepresented in occupations that require higher skills, such as supervisors or middle
management.
Gu et al. (2016) observe the skill biased effects of trade liberalization, using a
two-step empirical analysis applied to administrative data for Denmark and Portugal.
The first step predicts the skill premium induced by trade shocks, while the second
step estimates the effects of the skill premium on the resulting skill distribution. The
main results for Denmark is that trade has a negative effect on the low-to-medium skill
premium and a positive effect on the medium-to-high skill premium. Thus the overall
distribution of skills in Denmark has a tendency to shift rightward and to become more
dispersed in response to a trade shock.
In particular, Berman et al. (1998) study the effects of skills based technological
change on the manufacturing sector in open economies. The study found that developed
countries are transitioning toward high-skill workers, despite rising relative skill prices.
This is indicative of a skill-biased demand shift that stems from the adoption of new
technology. This skills upgrading is most prominent in three manufacturing sectors:
machinery, electrical machinery and printing and publishing in US. Overall, the authors
suggest that the fall in the share of manufacturing employment results in part from
increased trade exposure, but can be largely attributed to the factor content of skills
based technological change that has displaced unskilled workers in manufacturing.
Muendler (2010) extend the empirical methods used in Menezes-Filho and Muend-
ler (2007), to observe the nature of workforce re-allocations. The paper indicates that
within the traded-goods sector, there is a distinct occupational downgrading and a sim-
ultaneous educational upgrading, whereby firms fill expanding low skill occupations
with increasingly educated employees. Between sectors, there is a labour demand shift
towards the lowest and highest skilled workers. This is due to relatively weaker de-
clines of traded-goods industries that use low skilled labour intensely and to relat-
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ively stronger expansions of non-traded-goods industries that use high-skilled labour
intensively. These observed patterns are consistent with predictions of trade theory,
Heckscher-Ohlin Theory, for a low-skill abundant economy, such as SA. Importantly,
these patterns relate back to skill based rigidities to mobility in that semi-skilled occupa-
tions may experience greater barriers to reallocation within a sector relative to unskilled
and more highly skilled occupations, which will be investigated further in this study.
Nevertheless, Muendler (2010) suggests that the pattern in work-flows is nuanced
as workforce changeovers are not achieved through reassignments of labour to new
tasks within firms nor by reallocation of labour across firms and traded-goods industries.
Rather, Muendler (2010) suggests industries, experiencing high trade exposure shrink
their labour force by dismissing less educated workers more frequently, compared to
more educated workers. Most displaced workers then move to non-traded-goods in-
dustries or shift out of formal employment. In particular, Brazil’s trade liberalization
triggers worker displacements especially from previously protected industries, as pre-
dicted by trade theory.
2.1 Trade Liberalization Episode in South Africa
SA signed the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) proposal during Ur-
uguay Round in 1994. This marked the onset of trade liberalization in SA, with the
expectation of promoting export-led growth and increased foreign direct investment.
Edwards (2005) describes the transformation of trade policy, which involved limiting
approximately 98 percent of tariff lines at the Harmonized System (HS) eight-digit
level and simplifying the tariff range to six categories. Furthermore, the transformation
of policy includes rationalizing tariff lines and placing tariffs of quantitative restric-
tions on agricultural products. Lastly, the proposal involved allowing special provisions
for textile, clothing and motor industries, which included extension of the adjustment
period and increased upper bound tariff rates. Thereafter, in 1996, the paper suggests
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that the New Tariff Rationalization Process (TRP) was formulated, which included the
reduction of tariff lines and peaks and the conversion of formula and specific duties into
ad-valorem rates.
The onset of the twenty-first century was marked by increased trade liberalization
negotiations, whereby SA was involved in various prominent trade liberalization agree-
ments, which we will now consider in some detail. Importantly, SA signed the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) Free Trade Protocol, which was implemen-
ted in 2000 and achieved 85 percent duty-free trade in 2008, as recorded by DTI (2017).
The publication describes the SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
(TDCA) of 2000, which by 2010 accommodated the EU’s offer to liberalize 95 percent
of its duties on SA sourced goods by 2010 and was reciprocated by SA in 2012 with an
offer to liberalize 86 percent of its duties on EU sourced goods. Furthermore, in 2000,
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) allowed special access to US ori-
ginated products. In addition, in 2002, the SACU Agreement was renegotiated, which
comprised of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland, and was fol-
lowed by the SACU-Mercosur Preferential Trade Agreement of 2004. Lastly, in 2006,
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)-SACU Free Trade Agreement was estab-
lished, which came into effect in 2008. Hence, over the period, 2000 to 2011, there was
a sudden, unanticipated increase in trade integration of SA with the rest of the world.
The manner in which the SA labour force has assimilated these shocks will be analyzed
further in the next sections.
Table 1 presents the industry specific changes in tariff rates in SA. Specifically, the
results indicate that while tariff protection on mining, in which SA has a comparative has
been almost entirely removed, the largest tariff changes in manufacturing has occurred
in metal products and machinery, followed by fuel, petroleum and chemical products,
and lastly textiles, clothing and footwear, where we can expect the largest reallocation
of labour to occur towards other sectors.
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Table 1: The change in simple average tariff rates by industry, 1990–2011.
Simple average tariff Percentage point
rates (percentages) decrease
1996 2001 2011 1996 - 2011
Agriculture, forestry and fish-
ing
22,8 18,9 15,7 7,1
Mining 9,9 1,1 0,3 9,7
Food; beverages and tobacco
products
13,7 1,1 9,9 3,8
Textiles; clothing and footwear 40,8 23,5 18,7 22,1
Wood products 9,1 6,8 4,8 4,2
Fuel; petroleum and chemical
products
9,6 4,1 3,7 6,0
Non-metallic products 7,3 4,1 4,0 3,3
Metal products and machinery 7,6 4,0 2,8 4,9
Electrical machinery 12,8 7,1 6,3 6,5
Electronic products 4,6 1,6 3,0 1,6
Transport equipment 12,3 8,0 6,2 6,1
Furniture and recycling 21,6 16,9 15,4 6,3
Mean 14,3 8,1 7,5 6,8
Source: Author’s own calculations, using simple average tariff data
3 Methodology
3.1 Theoretical Motivation and Empirical Approach
3.1.1 Theoretical Foundation
This study seeks to determine how trade reform that has induced increases in SA’s im-
ports by SA, has affected the distribution or movement of labour across SA local labour
markets. In order to achieve this end, I use the empirical approach in the study by
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Baldàrrago and Salinas (2017), which was conducted on the Peru local labour mar-
ket. Under the framework outlined by the study, region d, the local labour market
region of interest, is treated as a small open economy within a monopolistic compet-
ition model. In particular, we assume that the economy is open to both trade in goods
and the inter-regional/ inter-sectoral movement of labour; however, we do not assume
perfect mobility of labour. The central premise underlying this framework is that we
expect incomplete redistribution of labour in response to trade shocks. The aim is then
to determine how tariff liberalization affects migration across regions, controlling for
the changes in various economic conditions.
3.1.2 Empirical Method
The analysis hinges on constructing a weighted import tariff at the regional level that
represents the industrial structure and level of protection, provided to industries in that
region. The aim is then to use regressions at the regional level to derive the relationship
between the changes in the estimated regional tariff indicator and the changes in the
number of migrant flows across regions d. To achieve this end, we construct a tariff






In this expression we consider the manufacturing goods sectors, which comprise
industries k. Furthermore, Ld,k,1996 denotes the number of employees at the local mu-
nicipal district d, employed in industry k in year 1996, Tkt is the simple average tariff
linked to industry k, and T Ld,1996 is the total number of employees at municipality d in
year 1996. In general, equation 1 is the mean of the tariffs linked to industry k at each
municipality d, weighted by the share of employees in each industry in year 1996, the
initial period of observation.
Variation in infrastructure across municipalities is expected to strongly influence the
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decision to migrate. Municipalities with better basic service delivery would attract more
migrants and hence we need to control for this impact in the regression to remove vari-
ation in the empirical model, not attributed to tariff reform. In this study, we use prin-
ciple component analysis to derive a measure of infrastructure intensity per household
that includes access to sanitation, toilet facilities and heating/lighting. This measure
controls for changes in the environment that are likely to provide a strong push/pull
factor with respect to migration in that we expect migration to flow towards areas of
improving infrastructure.
At the same time, to isolate the effects of tariff reform on migration, we need to
control for the changes in regional size, that may independently affect the level of mi-
gration over time. Consequently, we control for the changes in population size, house-
hold income (proxy for GDP), employment level and the number of firm entrants in
the empirical model, which are used as measures of the change in regional magnitude
and development that if ignored in the empirical model, may spuriously imply a link
between trade reform and migration. We also account for the initial manufacturing
share of total employment to control for technological changes that are likely to have
occurred over the period of study and furthermore, we consider the interaction between
initial manufacturing share and the tariff indices in order to observe the significance of
this simultaneous effect on migration. The premise is that initial tariffs were high in
manufacturing sectors, compared to other sectors and thus the labour reallocation effect
may be more responsive to initial manufacturing shares.
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3.2 Estimation and Specification



















































We begin by examining the relationship between tariff reform and internal migration at
the municipal level by means of an OLS model specification (2). In more detail, the
paper measures the effect of a change in the regional tariff on bilateral migration flows
across regions (ie. from municipality i to j at time t), using a gravity model of mi-
gration. importantly, the study focuses on deriving a fairly parsimonious model, while
uncovering the mechanisms through which tariff reform may induce internal migration
across regions.
In this expression, i and j are the origin and destination municipality of interest
and t is the observed year. Mi jt denotes the bilateral migration measure used, which
represents the aggregate number of migrants, who moved from origin (or previous)
municipality i to destination (or residing) municipality j for the periods, 1996 to 2001
and 2001 to 2011. This data are extracted from the 2001 Census and 2011 Census,
respectively. Then, the aggregate level of migrants in each of the two periods is taken
to construct the change in bilateral migration between 1996 to 2001 and 2001 to 2011;
this measure is then normalized by the mean population in each period at the origin




, denoted the annualized migration rate. Furthermore, Tdt is the municipal level
tariff specified in equation 1 at period t, which we use to construct the change in the
tariff measure over the full period, 1996 to 2011.
The estimate of interest, β1 and β2 are thus the estimated relations between the
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change in the municipal level tariff at the origin and destination municipalities, respect-
ively, and and the change in the bilateral internal migration flows between regions. Ad-
ditionally, the vectors ∆lnX ′it and ∆lnX
′
jt contain, in most specifications, a set of controls
for the municipalities’ change in the mean (ie. the difference in mean of 2001-2011 and
1996-2001) infrastructure intensity per household, population size, household income,
employment and the number of firm entrants across municipalities. These variables
are constructed to account for changes in regional size that might independently affect












+ γ∆lnX ′it +λ∆lnX
′
jt + ei jt (3)
Consider specification 3, we expect that for the period, 1996 to 2011, β1 should be
negative, implying that an increase in tariff protection in the origin municipality corres-
ponds with a decrease in migration outflows or labour reallocation. On the other hand,
we expect that β2 should be positive, suggesting that an increase in tariff protection in


























jt + ei jt
(4)
Furthermore, when we consider the interaction between the initial share of manu-
facturing in total employment and the tariff measure in the respective origin and des-
tination municipalities, we expect that β3 will have a negative sign, indicating that the
simultaneous effect of an increase in tariff protection and initial manufacturing share
of employment is expected to be associated with an decrease in the number of leaving
migrants. The reverse coefficient signs are expected in the case of destination related
variables, where we expect that β4 should be positive, indicating that municipalities
with increased tariff protection should experience an increase in the frequency of new
entrants. Importantly, we consider specification 3 as the main regression of interest.
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3.2.2 Methodological Concerns and Instrumental Variable Strategy
Before conducting our analysis, we examine some methodological concerns that may
arise from specification 3. A key economic question arises: are there political incent-
ives that may lead to an indirect link between changes in tariff levels and changes in
socioeconomic factors that might independently affect migration. There is evidence
that turns to (i) the influence of lobbyist and other pressure groups on trade policy de-
cisions, (ii) the incentive of policymakers to provide some support to sluggish industries
and lastly (iii) the incentive of government to maximize tariff revenues that may distort
the change in the tariff levels across manufacturing sectors (Findlay and Wellisz 1982).
In particular, the endogeneity in the tariff level may attenuate the effect of a change
in tariff level on bilateral migration flows. Furthermore, with respect to the phasing
down of tariffs, negotiated under WTO, part of the process was simplifying the tariff
structure, reducing tariff dispersion and removing tariff peaks, which is reflected in a
negative relationship between the change in tariffs and the initial tariff levels.
In this paper, we address this endogeneity problem outlined previously, by con-
structing an instrumentation strategy, which considers initial regional tariff levels, as
performed by Cheng (2015), Topalova (2010) and Baldàrrago and Salinas (2017). This
strategy arises from the premise that tariff changes are linearly related to initial tariffs:
the higher the initial tariff, the larger the tariff cut. Since initial tariff rates are only
correlated with labour mobility through the relationship between initial tariff levels and
the change in tariffs, as described, this may be considered an appropriate instrument.
Figure 1 presents the inverse relationship between the change in tariffs from 1996 to
2011 and the regional initial tariff levels in 1996.
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Source: Author’s own calculations, using SA Census and simple average tariff data.
Figure 1: The relationship between the change in the tariff measure and the regional
initial tariff measure, 1996–2011
3.3 Data and Stylized Facts
We use data from the ten percent SA Census for the years, 1996, 2001 and 2011 at
the (one-digit) SIC level for 234 local municipalities to obtain migration, employment
and regional data. A challenge that arose in this study lay in accounting for changes
in municipal demarcations between 2001 and 2011. To address this problem, the study
made use of ArcGIS to aggregate data at a main place level in 1996 and district level
in 2001 to the 2011 municipality level using the union tool. In more detail, to obtain
the bilateral migration measure at the municipal level, a union ratio was applied to
achieve consistency in the number of municipalities from 262 in 2001 to 234 in 2011
and to convert the 1996 main place codes to the 2011 municipal classification of 234
municipalities. Furthermore, we use annual data on simple average tariff rates linked to
economic activities at the (two-digit) SIC level for the years 1996 to 2011. We construct
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the municipal level tariffs in equation 1, based on weighted average tariffs that take into
account preferential tariffs that SA applies to imports from several countries. We then
link tariffs to economic activities in each municipality by matching tariff codes with
industrial codes in the merged census data set.
Source: Author’s own calculations, using SA Census and simple average tariff data.
Figure 2: The aggregate number of migrants (left scale) and the aggregate simple aver-
age tariff rates (right)
Figure 2 presents the total number of migrants, normalized by the mean origin pop-
ulation, according to year moved, and the aggregate simple average tariff rates across
industries and time. Post-apartheid, from 1996 to 2001, the number of migrants rose,
while the simple average tariff rates fell. However, when we consider the annualized
rates, we notice that there has been a slight decrease in the rate of migration in the
second period relative to the initial period, while simple average tariff rates fell by a
large margin in the first period and a much smaller margin in the second period, as dis-
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played in Figure 2. This is because the initial tariff reform was fairly aggressive from
1996 to 2001, whilst the subsequent period was marked by gradual reduction in tariffs
and ultimately tariff stabilization. Critically, there is a structural break at 2001, where
the stabilization of the simple average tariff rates coincided with a decrease in the rate
of migration.
Table 2 presents the composition of migrants and the migrant rates according to
demographic characteristics. In terms of the pattern of migration by gender, although
from 1996 to 2001, there was relative gender equality of migration, the period post 2001
was marked by a slightly larger increase in the number of male migrants relative to their
female counterparts. Furthermore, the migration rate for males and females was 1.9 and
1.7, respectively in the first period, followed by a uniform reduction in the second period
across gender groups. The skills distribution of migrants reveals that there is a trend to-
wards greater mobility of skilled individuals as skilled migration rates were the highest
with 3.7 and 2.3 in the two periods of study, while unskilled and semi-skilled individu-
als were less mobile. Migration rates fell particularly sharply for these groups in the
period post 2001, which is consistent with the international literature. The underlying
premise is that the less skilled individuals are the least mobile and with increased skills
upgrading in the workplace, these individuals may be less likely to relocate between
industries and regions. This is also evident from the rise in the proportion of skilled
migrants from 13.9 to 20 percent and a fall in the share of unskilled migrants from 17.7
to 10.3 percent in the two periods. In terms of the share of migrant workers, there has
been a distinct rise in the number of employed migrants from 49 to 60 percent between
the two periods of study, which reflects current work status.
Critically, young adults (between 15 and 35 years of age) contribute the greatest
share of migrants with 66.9 and 64.2 percent between the periods, 1996 to 2001 and
2001 to 2011, respectively. Overall, young adults have higher migration rates, namely
2.2 and 0.9, respectively, across the two periods, while middle-aged adults, between 36
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Table 2: The migrant share as a composition of total migrants and the migrant share of
total group population, according to demographic and economic status
Annualized migrant share
Migrant share as a (within groups) of total
Migrants by population composition of total (mean over period) working
group migrants (%) age population (%)
1996-2001 2001-2011 1996-2001 2001-2011
Aggregate 1,8 0,8
Gender
female 50,3 48,6 1,7 0,7
male 49,7 51,4 1,9 0,9
Skill level
skilled migrants 13,9 20,0 3,7 2,3
semi-skilled migrants 60,8 65,9 3,4 0,9
unskilled migrants 17,7 10,3 0,8 0,4
(unspecified) 7,6 3,8 - -
Race group
African migrants 68,5 70,2 1,7 0,6
Coloured migrants 8,5 6,7 2,9 1,0
Indian migrants 2,7 3,5 2,3 2,1
White migrants 20,2 17,9 3,6 2,2
(unspecified) - 1,7 - -
Age cohort
young adult migrants 66,9 64,2 2,2 0,9
adult migrants 28,0 30,1 1,5 0,7
mature adult migrants 5,1 5,7 0,7 0,4
Notes: All migrant shares are calculated as a composition of total migrants (ie.
Aggregate to 1 hundred approximately, allowing for unspecified observations.)
Migrant rates are calculated as the ratio of migration by group, normalized by
the group’s total working age population and annualized by the duration of
each period of study. Source: Author’s own calculations, using SA Census
data.
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and 55 have lower relative migration rates at 1.5 and 0.7, respectively. In terms of the
pattern in migration by race group, Africans constitute the largest share of migrants with
approximately 68.5 and 70.2 percent over the two respective periods of study, followed
by White migrants with approximately 20.2 and 17.9 percent. Notably, when we con-
sider the migration rates, we notice that migration rates are higher for White migrants at
3.6 and 2.2, across the two periods, which is supported by the literature. The underlying
premise is that White South Africans, previously advantaged, may have better access
to knowledge and resources required in relocation, compared to other racial groups.
There are also cultural and social considerations that play a role in the lower mobility
of Africans and other racial cohorts.
For consistency, we consider Bells and Charles-Edwards (2013), which outlines the
internal migration rates for 33 countries across several continents. The paper considers
the aggregate net migration rates (ANMR), computed as the net annual migration flows
at the regional level, divided by the total regional population. Importantly, the study
finds that in 2000, the migration rate was estimate to be 1.4 percent for SA, which was
higher than other Africa countries, namely Senegal, Ghana and Mauritius with approx-
imately 0.6, 0.6 and 0.5 percent, respectively. More broadly, relative to SA, the internal
migration rate was reported to be higher for China at 1.7 percent, lower for Brazil at
0.5 percent, but in line with Malaysia and Greece at 1.4 percent. This implies that our
estimate of 1.8 percent seems slightly higher than the estimated migration rate of 1.4,
reported in the study by Bells and Charles-Edwards (2013). This may be attributed to
the full period, 1996 to 2001, which was utilized in constructing the annualized measure
in this study.
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Source: Author’s own calculations, using SA Census data
Figure 3: Kernel density plot of the annualized out-migration flow rates across origin
municipalities, 1996–2011
Source: Author’s own calculations, using SA Census data
Figure 4: Kernel density plot of the annualized out-migration flow rates across origin
municipalities according to age cohort, 1996–2011
Figure 3 shows kernel densities for the annualized migration rates across both peri-
ods of study, which is constructed to display the dispersion across regions and the
changes over time. From 1996 to 2001, the internal migration rates have higher dis-
persion and a higher mean, while in the latter period, the migration rate density shows a
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distinct leftward shift, indicative of lower mobility in the second period, 2001 to 2011.
Furthermore, when we consider the life-cycle characteristic of migrants in Figure 4,
a prominent feature arises whereby young adult migrants have higher mean migration
rates, followed by middle-aged adults and lastly mature adults as theory predicts that
young adults are the most likely to migrate due to their adaptability to new environ-
ments and their willingness to align themselves with positions that arise in the labour
market, thus it is expected that for young adults there is a high correlation between
migration rates and labour market opportunities (Ferreira Filho and Horridge 2010).
Source: Author’s own calculations, using SA Census data
Figure 5: Kernel density plot of the annualized out-migration flow rates across origin
municipalities according to gender, 1996–2011
Figure 5 presents the kernel densities by gender and importantly, there is very little
observed difference in the probability distributions of the migration rates by gender;
although males are slightly more mobile by a small margin relative to their female
counterparts. Consistent with the theory of skills biased migration frictions, Figure
6 indicates that skilled migrants are the most mobile, although there exists high disper-
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sion, followed by semi-skilled and lastly unskilled migrants, who may be considered the
least mobile. A possibility is that with higher education attainment, individuals may be
more aware of labour market opportunities in other regions. Figure 7 presents the ker-
nel densities by race group. Importantly, we notice that white migrants have the highest
mean migration rates, followed by Indian, Coloured and lastly, African migrants.
Source: Author’s own calculations, using SA Census data
Figure 6: Kernel density plot of the annualized out-migration flow rates across origin
municipalities according to skill level, 1996–2011
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Source: Author’s own calculations, using SA Census data
Figure 7: Kernel density plot of the annualized out-migration flow rates across origin
municipalities according to race group, 1996–2011
4 Results
In this section, we quantify the effects of trade reform on SA internal migration with a
focus on the indirect manufacturing employment effects thereof. We present our results
as follows: First, the paper discusses the effects of trade reform on the change in the
internal migration rate by using an OLS regression, using specification (3). Then we
conduct a 2SLS regression where we instrument the change in the tariff measure with
the initial regional tariff level in 1996. A prominent feature is that there is a slight
positive relationship between the destination tariff and the destination migration rate,
while there is very little relationship thereof observed for the origin municipality.
Table 3: Tariff reform and the change in bilateral migration flows from origini to
destination j municipalities, 1996–2011: OLS Estimates
I. OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable: Annualized ∆ Mi jtPit/1000
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
∆ln(1+Tari f fit) -0.337* -0.120 -0.0892 -0.0755 -0.101 0.330 -0.0495
(0.196) (0.214) (0.216) (0.224) (0.216) (0.304) (0.577)
∆ln(1+Tari f f jt) 1.358*** 1.539*** 1.494*** 1.520*** 1.548*** 1.167*** -0.177
(0.288) (0.286) (0.288) (0.282) (0.289) (0.267) (0.548)
∆ln(In f rastructureit) 0.101*** -0.0906** -0.0903** -0.0810** -0.0737** -0.0733*
(0.0208) (0.0387) (0.0388) (0.0377) (0.0375) (0.0375)
∆ln(In f rastructure jt) 0.0635*** 0.122*** 0.120*** 0.110*** 0.107*** 0.108***
(0.0114) (0.0252) (0.0242) (0.0243) (0.0241) (0.0243)
∆ln(Incomeit) -0.203*** -0.191*** -0.198*** -0.181*** -0.178***
(0.0554) (0.0479) (0.0501) (0.0483) (0.0495)
∆ln(Income jt) 0.0560*** 0.0881** 0.0937*** 0.0731** 0.0829**
(0.0195) (0.0363) (0.0354) (0.0359) (0.0377)
∆ln(Employedit) -0.0163 -0.00719 -0.0192 -0.0230
(0.0267) (0.0260) (0.0271) (0.0274)
∆ln(Employed jt) -0.0457 -0.0551 -0.0346 -0.0455
(0.0366) (0.0345) (0.0368) (0.0390)
∆ln(Entryit) -0.0183* -0.00996 -0.00866
(0.00979) (0.00994) (0.0104)
∆ln(Entry jt) 0.0264** 0.0170 0.0209*
(0.0127) (0.0118) (0.0114)




∆ln(1+Tari f fit)xMS j,1996 18.08***
(6.803)
MS j,1996 -0.402*** 0.639
(0.116) (0.434)
Constant -0.00441 -0.0921*** 0.109 0.0940 0.0965 0.0981 -0.00223
(0.0172) (0.0234) (0.0713) (0.0648) (0.0634) (0.0607) (0.0656)
Observations 15,027 15,027 15,027 15,027 15,027 15,027 15,027
R-squared 0.002 0.007 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.017
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3 presents the results from estimation of equation (3). First, the migration rate
is highly significant and positively related to the change in the tariff measure for the
destination municipality for most specifications; however, while we observe a negative
sign on the tariff measure estimate for the origin municipality, this is not significant at
the 5 percent level as expected. According to the estimate in model (1), a 10 percent in-
crease in the differential tariff in the destination municipality implies a 13.6 percentage
point increase in the migration rate or 13.6 more migrants per 1000 individuals in the
originating region, which is significant at the 1 percent level. On the other hand, a 10
percent increase in the differential tariff in the origin municipality is associated with a
3.4 percentage point decrease in the migration rate, which is only significant at the 10
percent level.
In model (2), infrastructure intensity is included. The coefficient on the destination
tariff remains significant and increases slightly, but the coefficient on the origin tariff
loses significance. Tariffs also affect income in the region through changes in employ-
ment and wages. To control for these potential effects, we include household income
in (3). Firstly, income is shown to reduce out-migration and increase in-migration. The
coefficient on the destination tariff, however remain unaffected. In column (4) and (5),
additional controls for changes in economic activity are included, namely change in
employment in (4) and change in firm entry in (5). The tariff coefficient on destination
remains significant with a slight increase in size. A rise in firm entry is shown to reduce
out-migration and encourage in-migration.
Importantly we control for the initial manufacturing share of employment in model
(6), and uncover that a higher share of manufacturing within a municipality in 1996
implies an increase in the migration rate for the origin municipality, while the reverse is
true for the destination municipality. Model (7) includes the interaction between the tar-
iff measures and the initial manufacturing share of employment for the respective origin/
destination municipalities. importantly, we observe that the simultaneous effect of a 10
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percent increase in the differential tariff and the initial manufacturing share of employ-
ment is associated with an 18.7 more migrants per 1000 individuals in the originating
region. Crucially, migrants were more likely to exit regions with a high manufacturing
share of employment and were less likely to enter regions with a high manufacturing
share of employment. As we would expect, the coefficient on tariff (destination) falls as
the change in manufacturing tariff would have had a disproportionate effect on regions
where municipalities accounted for a high share of employment.
The estimates show a systematic pattern, broadly consistent with our theoretical
predictions. Nevertheless, the analysis also uncovers empirical puzzles. Overall, push
effects are estimated to be insignificantly different from zero in Table 3. One possib-
ility is that push factors are nullified due to the effect of poverty, skill and life-cycle
considerations in the origin municipality, but that higher tariffs in certain regions have a
significant pull effect, inducing an inflow of migrants as economically active individu-
als relocate in search of higher income jobs, better infrastructure and towards expanding
industries with relatively higher tariff measures.
We now turn to the 2SLS regressions to control for potential endogeneity of the
tariff indices. Table 4 presents the 2SLS results, whereby the initial tariff is used as
an instrument for the change in tariff level, considered previously. The results are more
consistent with expectations and the systematic breakdown of the empirical models sug-
gest that while there is a significant negative effect of origin differential tariffs on the
migration rate, the reverse is also highly significant and positive, as shown in model (1),
highlighting the existence of push and pull effects, underlying the theory of trade in-
duced migration and labour market restructuring. In particular, a 10 percent increase in
the differential origin tariff is associated with a 2.7 percentage point decrease in the mi-
gration rate, while a 10 percent increase in the differential destination tariff implies a 5.6
percentage point increase in the migration rate, which is more than triple the magnitude
of the opposing effect observed in the origin municipality. Nevertheless, the other model
Table 4: Initial tariff levels and the change in bilateral migration flows from origini to
destination j municipalities, 1996–2011: 2SLS Estimates
I. OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable: Annualized ∆ Mi jtPit/1000
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
∆ln(1+Tari f fit) -0.267*** -0.230 -0.225 -0.213 -0.240 0.173 -1.228
(0.0726) (0.200) (0.198) (0.204) (0.199) (0.288) (0.911)
∆ln(1+Tari f f jt) 0.558*** 1.767*** 1.723*** 1.747*** 1.774*** 1.456*** 4.500***
(0.106) (0.276) (0.277) (0.276) (0.279) (0.277) (0.872)
∆ln(In f rastructureit) 0.100*** -0.0902** -0.0897** -0.0803** -0.0731* -0.0733*
(0.0207) (0.0389) (0.0389) (0.0378) (0.0377) (0.0378)
∆ln(In f rastructure jt) 0.0669*** 0.128*** 0.125*** 0.116*** 0.112*** 0.115***
(0.0116) (0.0254) (0.0243) (0.0245) (0.0243) (0.0247)
∆ln(Incomeit) -0.202*** -0.192*** -0.198*** -0.183*** -0.181***
(0.0553) (0.0481) (0.0504) (0.0491) (0.0488)
∆ln(Income jt) 0.0581*** 0.0910** 0.0967*** 0.0781** 0.0729**
(0.0195) (0.0365) (0.0357) (0.0369) (0.0363)
∆ln(Employedit) -0.0142 -0.00495 -0.0165 -0.0179
(0.0265) (0.0258) (0.0268) (0.0270)
∆ln(Employed jt) -0.0468 -0.0563 -0.0382 -0.0308
(0.0371) (0.0349) (0.0379) (0.0371)
∆ln(Entryit) -0.0187* -0.0109 -0.00993
(0.00985) (0.0101) (0.0101)
∆ln(Entry jt) 0.0266** 0.0182 0.0165
(0.0127) (0.0115) (0.0117)




∆ln(1+Tari f fit)xMS j,1996 26.55***
(6.572)
MS j,1996 -0.358*** -0.446***
(0.123) (0.120)
Constant -0.0159** -0.0888*** 0.107 0.0918 0.0942 0.0966 0.141**
(0.00741) (0.0235) (0.0710) (0.0643) (0.0629) (0.0598) (0.0638)
Observations 41,101 15,027 15,027 15,027 15,027 15,027 15,027
R-squared 0.001 0.008 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.018
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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specifications display the same pattern as shown previously, whereby the effect of the
origin differential tariff is nullified with the inclusion of appropriate controls. However,
the 2SLS estimates indicate a larger positive effect of the differential destination tar-
iff on the bilateral migration rate, compared to the OLS results, considered previously.
Hence, a key feature is that the endogeneity of tariffs attenuate the effect of trade reform
on migration flows.
Model (2) includes infrastructure intensity and indicates that an increase in the dif-
ferential destination tariff corresponds with a relatively larger increase in the migration
rate, compared to the corresponding OLS estimates. Furthermore, with the inclusion of
income, employment and firm entry in columns (3) to (5), the signs on the destination
tariff estimates adjust in line with expectations and are larger in size than the corres-
ponding OLS results. In addition, when we consider the initial manufacturing share of
employment in model (6), it is evident that an increase in the differential destination tar-
iff corresponds with a rise in the migration rate. Furthermore, model (7) presents more
consistent estimates than the corresponding OLS model thereof, as we observe that a
10 percent increase in the differential destination tariff is associated with an increase of
4.5 migrants per 1000 individuals of the origin municipality’s population; furthermore,
we observe a negative sign on the estimate for the change in the origin tariff measure,
although this estimate is not significant. The simultaneous effect of a 10 percent in-
crease in the destination tariff and the initial destination manufacturing share implies
26.6 more migrants per 1000 individuals in the origin. Conversely, a 10 percent rise in
the origin tariff and the initial origin manufacturing share corresponds with an 11.3 per-
centage point decrease in the migration rate. A possibility is that, in practice, migrants
may be more likely to leave regions of high initial manufacturing share of employment
and relocate towards regions of lower initial manufacturing shares, perhaps services.
The asymmetry in the magnitude and significance of push and pull factors may be
attributed to i.) the age or life-cycle stage of migrants, which may determine whether
29
tariff changes in the origin municipality are sufficient to induce out-migrations, taking
into account asset accumulation and the number of dependents and ii.) the skill level of
migrants, which may determine the level of awareness of economically active individu-
als to opportunities in other regions and secondly, the ease with which these individuals
may transfer their skills across regions.
We now consider these age group and skill biased rigidities, as shown in Tables 5
to 8 in the Appendix. Crucially, when we disaggregate migrants by age and skill level,
we observe that the origin tariff is negative and highly significant in most specifications.
In terms of age group, we observe a stronger positive/negative influence of increased
trade protection on the destination/origin tariffs for young adults relative to middle-
aged and mature adults. When we consider skill level, there seems to be a stronger
positive/negative effect increased trade protection on the destination/origin tariffs for
skilled individuals. This is in line with the theory that young, skilled individuals are
the most mobile, while older less qualified individuals may experience more barriers
to mobility, which has consequences for welfare. Given the abundance of unskilled
labour in SA, we can expect that there may be substantial frictions to migration across
sectors and regions, which may exacerbate the negative effect of trade reform on overall
welfare. Furthermore, these negative effects may fall disproportionately on unskilled,
more mature individuals in the labour markets.
A limitation of the data used lies in the development of the census questionnaire,
whereby participants are asked when they last moved; it is possible that individuals that
moved within the census period of study are very mobile, hence these estimates may
conservatively estimate the impact of trade reform on migration. In addition to this
recency bias outlined, there may be a recollection bias as individuals may be less likely
to accurately state when they relocated as time passes and thus we can expect that within
each period of data collection, migration may ”spike” at the end of each period, which
may bias estimates.
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We compare these results to the empirical evidence found for other countries in
Bells and Charles-Edwards (2013) as described in Section 3.3. The authors considered
aggregate net migration rates (ANMR), as described in section 3.3. Within the African
context, we notice that our estimates of the pull effects on migration are slightly larger
than estimates found for Senegal with an ANMR of 1.4. However, our estimates are
slightly smaller in magnitude to that Ghana with an ANMR of 1.9. Within BRICS, our
estimates were larger than that of Brazil with and ANMR of 0.5, but less than China with
an ANMR of 1.7. Although, a challenge in comparing estimates for migration rates to
other countries is that there is a gap in the literature that considers trade liberalization
and internal migration flows within the same framework.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I empirically test the hypothesis of the existence of trade-induced migra-
tion within SA. The importance of this study lies in the observation that in a realistic
model without perfect labour mobility and in the presence of trade openness (and in-
creased import competition), labour reallocation may occur unevenly across sectors and
regions. The results suggest that higher relative tariffs faced by district producers are
associated with a rise in bilateral migration rates towards more protected industries and
importantly away from industries with high initial manufacturing share of employment.
Furthermore income and infrastructure play a significant role as push and pull factors in
the migration decision, while employment reflects nuanced results. Importantly, there
is asymmetry in the magnitude and significance of push and pull factors induced by
tariff reform, as in most specifications, the effect of origin tariff changes were negative
but insignificant, while the change in the destination tariff was found to have a highly
significant positive effect on the annualized migration rate.
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Appendix
Table 5: Tariff reform and the change in bilateral migration flows from origini to
destination j municipalities, according to age group, 1996–2011: OLS Estimates
I. OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable: Annualized ∆ Mi jtPit/1000
Young Adults Middle-aged Adults Mature Adults
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
∆ln(1+Tari f fit) -1.666*** -1.600*** -1.996** -0.885*** -0.790*** -1.212** -0.516*** -0.481*** -0.760**
(0.353) (0.366) (0.945) (0.224) (0.235) (0.594) (0.154) (0.158) (0.371)
∆ln(1+Tari f f jt) 3.640*** 4.343*** 0.255 2.038*** 2.338*** 0.0294 0.809*** 0.913*** 0.205
(0.499) (0.511) (0.688) (0.301) (0.308) (0.507) (0.218) (0.227) (0.435)
∆ln(In f rastructureit) -0.0974** -0.0723* -0.0384 -0.0281 -0.00112 0.00109
(0.0398) (0.0394) (0.0253) (0.0252) (0.0205) (0.0204)
∆ln(In f rastructure jt) 0.429*** 0.418*** 0.184*** 0.180*** 0.0510*** 0.0494***
(0.0327) (0.0321) (0.0216) (0.0214) (0.0152) (0.0150)
∆ln(Incomeit) -0.167*** -0.103* -0.0878** -0.0589 -0.0510** -0.0473**
(0.0574) (0.0580) (0.0365) (0.0366) (0.0241) (0.0233)
∆ln(Income jt) 0.418*** 0.352*** 0.131*** 0.113*** 0.0429** 0.0319*
(0.0447) (0.0452) (0.0290) (0.0291) (0.0177) (0.0168)
∆ln(Employedit) 0.0353 -0.0155 0.0190 -0.00504 0.0290 0.0265
(0.0452) (0.0469) (0.0302) (0.0306) (0.0228) (0.0232)
∆ln(Employed jt) -0.235*** -0.170*** -0.0523* -0.0361 -0.0255 -0.0144
(0.0416) (0.0442) (0.0271) (0.0283) (0.0157) (0.0150)
∆ln(Entryit) -0.0501*** -0.0189 -0.00699 0.00695 -0.00540 -0.00389
(0.0155) (0.0159) (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.00773) (0.00794)
∆ln(Entry jt) 0.0982*** 0.0679*** 0.0395*** 0.0309*** 0.0142** 0.00961
(0.0187) (0.0182) (0.0114) (0.0112) (0.00653) (0.00693)
∆ln(1+Tari f fit)xMSi,1996 23.07** 13.38** 3.928
(9.602) (5.780) (3.741)
MSi,1996 2.639*** 1.340*** 0.252
(0.615) (0.368) (0.252)
∆ln(1+Tari f fit)xMS j,1996 33.74*** 23.41*** 5.928
(9.654) (6.088) (4.443)
MS j,1996 0.292 0.752** 0.0689
(0.545) (0.343) (0.250)
Constant -0.0667** -0.383*** -0.609*** -0.0316* -0.129** -0.282*** -0.0212 -0.0404 -0.0753*
(0.0278) (0.0782) (0.0938) (0.0189) (0.0532) (0.0616) (0.0141) (0.0382) (0.0388)
Observations 14,954 14,954 14,954 14,940 14,940 14,940 14,931 14,931 14,931
R-squared 0.006 0.026 0.036 0.005 0.014 0.018 0.002 0.004 0.005
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Initial tariff levels and the change in bilateral migration flows from origini to
destination j municipalities, according to age group, 1996–2011: 2SLS Estimates
I. OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable: Annualized ∆ Mi jtPit/1000
Young Adults Middle-aged Adults Mature Adults
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
∆ln(1+Tari f fit) -0.336*** -1.520*** -1.726 -0.208*** -0.741*** -1.031 -0.260*** -0.484*** -0.662
(0.0995) (0.333) (1.480) (0.0664) (0.216) (1.128) (0.0587) (0.168) (0.958)
∆ln(1+Tari f f jt) 1.125*** 4.816*** 11.32*** 0.637*** 2.586*** 5.710*** 0.291*** 0.944*** 1.319*
(0.151) (0.523) (1.292) (0.0900) (0.306) (0.846) (0.0709) (0.230) (0.740)
∆ln(In f rastructureit) -0.0959** -0.0698* -0.0375 -0.0270 -0.00133 0.000608
(0.0398) (0.0395) (0.0254) (0.0253) (0.0206) (0.0208)
∆ln(In f rastructure jt) 0.443*** 0.437*** 0.191*** 0.190*** 0.0534*** 0.0515***
(0.0333) (0.0332) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0154) (0.0155)
∆ln(Incomeit) -0.166*** -0.112* -0.0875** -0.0642* -0.0513** -0.0496**
(0.0575) (0.0574) (0.0366) (0.0365) (0.0243) (0.0238)
∆ln(Income jt) 0.426*** 0.332*** 0.135*** 0.101*** 0.0440** 0.0289*
(0.0451) (0.0436) (0.0291) (0.0284) (0.0178) (0.0167)
∆ln(Employedit) 0.0362 -0.00209 0.0196 0.00273 0.0294 0.0291
(0.0450) (0.0462) (0.0301) (0.0307) (0.0227) (0.0230)
∆ln(Employed jt) -0.237*** -0.138*** -0.0535** -0.0173 -0.0255 -0.00982
(0.0419) (0.0422) (0.0272) (0.0276) (0.0158) (0.0149)
∆ln(Entryit) -0.0495*** -0.0218 -0.00667 0.00524 -0.00534 -0.00450
(0.0155) (0.0158) (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.00773) (0.00794)
∆ln(Entry jt) 0.0988*** 0.0590*** 0.0398*** 0.0252** 0.0142** 0.00818
(0.0186) (0.0179) (0.0114) (0.0111) (0.00651) (0.00673)
∆ln(1+Tari f fit)xMSi,1996 -13.01 -7.346 -1.582
(11.96) (9.259) (7.261)
MSi,1996 1.331*** 0.580*** 0.0227
(0.179) (0.120) (0.0760)
∆ln(1+Tari f fit)xMS j,1996 68.82*** 31.49*** 5.425
(9.871) (6.744) (5.887)
MS j,1996 -1.775*** -0.649*** -0.283***
(0.184) (0.117) (0.0806)
Constant -0.0185** -0.372*** -0.178** -0.0136** -0.123** -0.0440 -0.0150*** -0.0414 -0.0210
(0.00901) (0.0772) (0.0873) (0.00604) (0.0522) (0.0615) (0.00494) (0.0365) (0.0399)
Observations 54,216 14,954 14,954 54,202 14,940 14,940 54,193 14,931 14,931
R-squared 0.002 0.028 0.038 0.001 0.015 0.019 0.001 0.005 0.005
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Tariff reform and the change in bilateral migration flows from origini to
destination j municipalities, according to skill level, 1996–2011: OLS Estimates
I. OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable: Annualized ∆ Mi jtPit/1000
Skilled Semi-skilled Unskilled
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
∆ln(1+Tari f fit) -3.698*** -3.978*** -6.158*** -3.166*** -3.436*** -4.407*** -0.755*** -0.737*** -0.900
(0.704) (0.739) (1.737) (0.627) (0.632) (1.542) (0.169) (0.187) (0.550)
∆ln(1+Tari f f jt) 8.105*** 9.565*** 2.385* 7.672*** 9.278*** 1.351 0.860*** 1.029*** -0.291
(0.966) (0.987) (1.421) (0.922) (0.942) (1.103) (0.229) (0.230) (0.470)
∆ln(In f rastructureit) -0.232*** -0.193*** -0.169*** -0.117** -0.0578* -0.0499*
(0.0585) (0.0583) (0.0594) (0.0588) (0.0299) (0.0297)
∆ln(In f rastructure jt) 0.798*** 0.783*** 0.945*** 0.920*** 0.107*** 0.104***
(0.0695) (0.0687) (0.0620) (0.0605) (0.0152) (0.0154)
∆ln(Incomeit) -0.333*** -0.227** -0.103 0.0266 -0.123*** -0.0986**
(0.0944) (0.0958) (0.0853) (0.0898) (0.0443) (0.0436)
∆ln(Income jt) 0.879*** 0.777*** 0.903*** 0.748*** 0.0855*** 0.0759**
(0.0824) (0.0787) (0.0749) (0.0711) (0.0279) (0.0318)
∆ln(Employedit) 0.247*** 0.161* 0.0422 -0.0603 0.0235 0.00304
(0.0953) (0.0945) (0.0829) (0.0875) (0.0228) (0.0234)
∆ln(Employed jt) -0.567*** -0.465*** -0.520*** -0.368*** -0.0481 -0.0398
(0.0642) (0.0620) (0.0584) (0.0575) (0.0321) (0.0368)
∆ln(Entryit) -0.0511 0.00134 -0.146*** -0.0825*** -0.0362*** -0.0244***
(0.0354) (0.0355) (0.0281) (0.0289) (0.00860) (0.00857)
∆ln(Entry jt) 0.223*** 0.177*** 0.232*** 0.163*** 0.0170 0.0119
(0.0214) (0.0207) (0.0260) (0.0253) (0.0125) (0.0117)
∆ln(1+Tari f fit)xMSi,1996 54.53*** 48.68*** 9.313*
(17.69) (15.89) (4.888)
MSi,1996 5.067*** 5.448*** 1.050***
(1.190) (1.044) (0.282)
∆ln(1+Tari f fit)xMS j,1996 61.70*** 59.87*** 13.54**
(18.11) (17.11) (5.413)
MS j,1996 0.817 -0.182 0.444
(0.968) (0.912) (0.353)
Constant -0.0454 -0.691*** -1.160*** -0.114** -1.037*** -1.458*** -0.0536*** -0.0391 -0.139***
(0.0555) (0.144) (0.179) (0.0508) (0.138) (0.171) (0.0140) (0.0461) (0.0466)
Observations 14,218 14,218 14,218 14,964 14,964 14,964 14,967 14,967 14,967
R-squared 0.009 0.032 0.039 0.009 0.041 0.054 0.002 0.011 0.014
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Initial tariff levels and the change in bilateral migration flows from origini to
destination j municipalities, according to skill level, 1996–2011: 2SLS Estimates
I. OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable: Annualized ∆ Mi jtPit/1000
Skilled Semi-skilled Unskilled
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
∆ln(1+Tari f fit) -0.730*** -3.256*** -0.113 -0.517*** -3.193*** -2.852 -0.186*** -0.737*** -1.566**
(0.206) (0.677) (2.778) (0.180) (0.591) (2.594) (0.0451) (0.151) (0.743)
∆ln(1+Tari f f jt) 2.365*** 10.16*** 19.28*** 2.262*** 9.835*** 19.48*** 0.290*** 1.234*** 3.531***
(0.286) (0.995) (2.501) (0.289) (0.990) (2.284) (0.0602) (0.206) (0.672)
∆ln(In f rastructureit) -0.228*** -0.186*** -0.167*** -0.112* -0.0578* -0.0502*
(0.0584) (0.0582) (0.0594) (0.0592) (0.0299) (0.0298)
∆ln(In f rastructure jt) 0.827*** 0.819*** 0.972*** 0.953*** 0.110*** 0.110***
(0.0703) (0.0700) (0.0633) (0.0622) (0.0155) (0.0159)
∆ln(Incomeit) -0.330*** -0.245** -0.102 0.00793 -0.123*** -0.102**
(0.0946) (0.0964) (0.0854) (0.0887) (0.0445) (0.0430)
∆ln(Income jt) 0.894*** 0.745*** 0.916*** 0.713*** 0.0879*** 0.0686**
(0.0830) (0.0772) (0.0755) (0.0689) (0.0282) (0.0303)
∆ln(Employedit) 0.243** 0.187* 0.0434 -0.0325 0.0241 0.00766
(0.0951) (0.0953) (0.0827) (0.0857) (0.0226) (0.0235)
∆ln(Employed jt) -0.568*** -0.408*** -0.522*** -0.310*** -0.0494 -0.0290
(0.0645) (0.0597) (0.0586) (0.0548) (0.0325) (0.0352)
∆ln(Entryit) -0.0490 -0.00366 -0.145*** -0.0890*** -0.0361*** -0.0254***
(0.0354) (0.0356) (0.0280) (0.0288) (0.00865) (0.00852)
∆ln(Entry jt) 0.224*** 0.159*** 0.233*** 0.147*** 0.0173 0.00875
(0.0214) (0.0197) (0.0259) (0.0243) (0.0124) (0.0119)
∆ln(1+Tari f fit)xMSi,1996 8.959 -19.85 -11.40*
(21.98) (20.65) (6.327)
MSi,1996 1.960*** 2.675*** 0.534***
(0.338) (0.314) (0.0955)
∆ln(1+Tari f fit)xMS j,1996 100.1*** 111.7*** 22.24***
(20.83) (16.92) (5.306)
MS j,1996 -2.944*** -3.865*** -0.367***
(0.325) (0.316) (0.0970)
Constant -0.0131 -0.658*** -0.281* -0.0261 -1.029*** -0.690*** -0.0165*** -0.0327 -0.00357
(0.0181) (0.141) (0.164) (0.0167) (0.136) (0.152) (0.00413) (0.0458) (0.0483)
Observations 53,480 14,218 14,218 54,226 14,964 14,964 54,229 14,967 14,967
R-squared 0.002 0.033 0.040 0.002 0.043 0.056 0.001 0.011 0.014
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Baldàrrago, E. and Salinas, G. (2017). Trade liberalization in Peru: Adjustment costs
amidst high labor mobility. International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 17/47,
International Monetary Fund, Washington.
Bell, M. and Charles-Edwards, E. (eds.). (2013). Cross-national comparisons of in-
ternal migration: An update on global patterns and trends. Technical Paper No.
2013/1. New York: United Nations.
Berman, E., Bound, J. and Machin, S. (1998). Implications of skill-biased technological
change: international evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(4):1245–79
Borjas, G., Freeman, R., Katz, L., Dinardo, J. and Abowd, J. (1997). How much do
36
immigration and trade affect labor market outcomes? Brookings Papers on Eco-
nomic Activity, 1997(1):1–90.
Casacuberta, C. and Gandelman, N. (2010). Reallocation and adjustment in the manu-
facturing sector in Uruguay, in Porto, G. and Hoekman, B. (eds.) (2010). Trade
adjustment costs in developing countries: Impacts, determinants and policy re-
sponses. Washington: Centre for Economic Policy Research, The World Bank.
Cheng, W. (2015). Regional variation in trade liberalization outcomes: Evidence from
Chinese manufacturing industry. The University of Manchester Research, Working
Paper No. 2015/8, The University of Manchester, United Kingdom.
Department of Trade and Industry. (2017). Trade agreements. Available: https://www.t-
hedti.gov.za/ [2017, 5 July].
Dix-Carneiro, R. (2014). Trade liberalization and labor market dynamics, Economet-
rica, 82(3):825–885.
Edwards, L. (2005). Has South Africa Liberalised its Trade?. South African Journal of
Economics, 73:754–775.
Edwards, L. (2001). Globalisation and skills bias of occupational employment in South
Africa. South African Journal of Economics, 69 (1): 40–71.
Fan, J. (2015). Internal geography, labor mobility, and the distributional impacts of
trade. Available: https://ssrn.com/ [2018, 13 January].
37
Ferreira Filho, J. and Horridge, M. (2010). Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture and
Internal Migrations in Brazil. CoPS Working Paper No. G-262, July 2016, Mel-
bourne: Centre of Policy Studies, Victoria University.
Findlay, R. and Wellisz, S. (1982). Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of
Trade Restrictions, and Welfare, in Bhagwati, J. and Srinivasan, T., (eds.), Import
Competition and Response, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Flaig, D., Grethe, H. and McDonald, S. (2013). Imperfect labor mobility in a CGE
model: does factor specific productivity matter? Paper presented at the 16th Annual
Conference on Global Economic Analysis. Available: https://www.gtap.agecon.pur-
due.edu/ [2018, 13 January].
Goldberg, P. and Pavcnik, N. (2003). Trade, inequality, and poverty: What do we know?
Evidence from recent trade liberalization episodes in developing countries. National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 10593, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Gu, G., Malik, S., Pozzoli, D. and Rocha, V. (2016). Trade induced skill upgrading:
Lessons from the Danish and Portuguese experiences. Institute for the Study of
Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 10035, Bonn, Germany.
Hayashi, M., Bauer, M., WINGAARDE, I. and MEMEDOVIC, O. (2004). Gender re-
lated issues in the textiles and clothing sector, in Tran-Nguyen, A. and Zampetti, A.,
(eds.), Trade and gender opportunities and challenges for developing countries.
United Nations, New York and Geneva.
38
Ma, L and Tang, Y. (2016). Geography, trade and internal migration in China. National
University of Singapore, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Mendez, O. (2015). The effect of Chinese import competition on Mexican local labor
markets. North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 34:364–380.
Menez-Filho, N and Muendler, M. (2007). Labor Reallocation in Response to Trade
Reform. CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Working Paper No. 1936, CESifo
Group Munich, Munich, Germany.
Muendler, M. (2010). Trade reform, employment allocation and worker flows, in Porto,
G. and Hoekman, B., (eds.), Trade adjustment costs in developing countries: Im-
pacts, determinants and policy responses. Washington: Centre for Economic Policy
Research, The World Bank.
Patron, R. (1999). The imperfect mobility of labour: Going from theory to ‘virtual’
reality. Simulations with simple trade models. Documento de Trabajo / FCS-DE,
Montevideo: UR. FCS-DE.
Rodrik, D. (2008). Understanding South Africa’s economic puzzles. Economics of
Transition, 16(4):769–797.
Topalova, P. (2010). Factor immobility and regional impacts of trade liberalization:
evidence on poverty from India. American Economics Journal: Applied Economics
2:1–41.
Tran-Nguyen, A. and Zampetti, A. (eds.). (2004). Trade and gender opportunities and
39
challenges for developing countries. New York and Geneva: United Nations.
Zi, Y. (2017). Trade liberalization and the great labor reallocation. The Graduate Insti-
tute of International and Development Studies (IHEID), Geneva, Switzerland.
40
